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Occasional Papers
No. 721

UNITED STATES COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES:
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Edwin H. Fedder

To be published in John Lovell and Philip Kronenberg, editors, The
New Civil-Military Relations: The Agonies of Adjusunent to Post
Vietnam Realities.

UNITED STATES COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES:
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

I

Since 1947, the United States has constructed a glob~l network
of "interlocking" alliances that- were designed· to extend an American
gua~antee to any

11

free 11 nation which.might come under (the_threat

of) an attack- by a "communist" nation.

The alliance policy of the

United States, best exemplified by N~TO, established a pattern which
was different from those which preceded

America's entrance into

big power politics after World War II.

This new role encouraged

American decision makers to reject notions of national separation,
non-alignment, neutrality, and non-involvemen_t not alone for the
United States but for others as well~ -This resulted in a very rapid
expansion of the number of alliances_ involving the United States-we are allied with 42 nations.
Although they hardly seemed so in their ~emporal context, our
early post war steps were rather halting and hesitant when compared
to some of our more recent adventures.

The Truman Doctrine as-

serted a guarantee and impleme~ted limited technical, military and
economic assistance programs to Greece and Turkey.

The Marshall

Plan was little more than a concept until it was operationalized by
the "users, 11 the Committee for European Economic Cooperation.

And

NATO was developed at ·1east as much in response to European demands
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as to American initiative.
In other parts of the world, our profile was considerably
lower.

The Rio Pact of 1947 was designed to implement the multi-

_lateralizatfon of the Monroe Doctrine that had_ beeri articulated
- in the Charter of the Organization of American _States.

By and

large, we were_ virtually non-:-participant "observers of developments
in the Middle East, South-Southeast Asia.and Africa.

We occupied

Japan, offered some aid and comfort to Chiang Kai-shek and were
content with- the division of Korea~
Our foreign policy in ·that now distant period was pragmatical' ly determined.
harm.

The USSR alone had the capability of doing us great

Since capabi],ity was widely held to be father of- the deed,

diminishing that capability would reduce the likelihood of the deed.
Capability might be jreduced in two ways:
adversary itself: or (2)

(1)

internally by the

externally by reasonof disproportionate

increases in the capability of one of the adversaries vis-it-vis the - other.

Since the U.S. could· not assume that the USSR would unilaterC

ally diminish its own capability, such diminution would have to be
imposed upon the Russians externally, if at.all.
In essence, the _assorte_d steps taken by the Truman administra..:.
tion in the brief period from 1947-49 added up to a foreign policy
which was designed to con:tain'Soviet power and influence from spreading in Europe.

The underlying assumptions of that foreign policy

-3-

begged the question of Soviet expansionist intent.

Nor did that

policy evince significant self-analytical preoccupation of American
-;;

decision makers with -notions of grand designs or even pre-determinedsets of preferred future behaviors.

Nt,- ideological traumas were

induced by accommodation to fascist_governments i-p_ Portugal and
Spain or to the communist government of Yugos).avia.

The decision

was made to effect a diminution of a Soviet threat that was based
upon assessment of Soviet capability, not Soviet ideology.
Truman's foreign policy was articulated in ideological not
·pragmatic terms.

The coup de Prague, the Berlin Blockade, Russia

policy regarding the·Baltic·Stai:es, etc., were presented as evi'.'"
dence of the depravity and essentially limitless aml;)itions of
Stalin to extend his domain.

Such articulation catered to popular

and Congressional emotions a~d were calculated pragmatically to
marshal! sufficient support for the programs; ·such articulations·
also inadvertently reinforced the development of often virulent
· anti-communist movements best exemplified, perhaps, by the career
of _the late Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin.

At the risk of

straining the analogy, anti-communism became for the Truman Administration a Frankenstein monster bent upon the destruction of its_
creator.
As the Truman-Acheson foreign policy was pragmatically deterinina t_e, the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy was ideologically
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I

- I

determinate.

Dulles viewed communistif as monolithic and predatory.

Communist states, including China, 'jere viewed a$ extensions of
Soviet power.and_a.s. instruments for achi~ving Soviet designs for
global domination.

To meet this threat, the Secret~ry sought to

ring the Soviet bloc with multilateral-alliances designed to ac~
complish for the Middle East· (through, the Baghdad Pact) and SouthSoutheast Asia (through SEATO) what NATO was presumed to have
achieved for Europe.

This structure was to be buttressed by a

variety of "commitments," patterned after ;the Truman Doctrine,
and by bilateral alliances with Taiwan and. Japan.

Indeed, in

very few years, the United-States w~s engaged in proliferating
alliance~ and commitments with virtually any country which proclaimed itself anti-communist and which indicated interest in
such an alliance or commitment.
The NATO and Tr~man Doctrine models proved to be very seductive to Dulles despite the fact that the necessary and sufficient conditions for NATO did not hold elsewhere and despite
the fact that the culprit in Greece (the raison d'etre of the
Doctrine) was_ not Soviet expansionism but Yugoslav meddling in
troubled waters.

The Baghdad Pact did not arise out o-£ Arab

states' perceptions of imminent Soviet threat, nor was its structure_ and organization based upon Middle Eas·tern precedents.

In-

deed although intended to link Arab states, only one joined, Iraq,
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· precipftating a revolution and subsequent withdrawal.

Although

the name was changed to Central Treaty Organization, CENTO, Arab
rejection remained total.

SEATO's experience was parallel:

it

did not arise in response .to indigenous demand, it did not represent indigenous perceptions of threat and only one principal
local state, Pakistan, joined.

Pakistan has since entered into

alliance vith China (the principal. target of SEATO) against India,
while retaining membership in SEATO.
Apparently, CENTO and SEATO have been dysfunctional rather
than functional to the conduct of American foreign policy to
the extent that they have been counterproductive rather than
productive of greater increments of security ~or the United States.
Both CENTO and SEATO were viewed as thinly veiled attempts to
perpetuate or reintroduce colonialism and imperialism into their
respective ~egions.

As such, they were perceived to be far more

threatening than was Soviet behavior.
Dulles' conviction as to the utter depravity of Soviet ambitions led him to insist that nations that did nqt support the
United States were ipso facto aiding and abetting the USSR.

Na-

tions that were willing to place themselves on the firing line
were entitled to the strongest practicable levels of American support.

Fence straddlers discovered rather quickly that they could

virtually guarantee American support by threatening to turn to
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the Russians if the United States balked.
Bythe end of-Dulles' tenure, every state that perceived or
claimed to perceive a communist threat ·or threatened to go over
;;

to the other side, was embraced in a commitment that was nurtured·
by United.States technical economic and military assistan~e.

Re-:-

ceiving American assistance became a major industry for many_ national economies.
motives

While. it would be difficult· to determine the

of government officials in receiving countries, it cer-

. tainly seems clear- that ·the production of side-benefits far exceeded the additional increment of security pro~uced.
The Dulles alliance ring served as a sort of · Berlin Wall
separating hostile camps.

Two global spheres of influenc.e were

separated by the ring with each of the superpowers tacitly agree-:ing not to intr1.1de in the oth'er' s sphere.

It was essentially

a rather pas_sive arrangement ~n which discordances -occurred infrequently and usually on our side. Many critics argued that
we had adopted a largely defensive posture. designed to react to
• communist initi~tives, · ther.eby according to the enemy the advantages
of selecting the timing and location of probing manoeuvres.
In addition, we sought to eat our·cake and have it by adopting a policy of massive retaliation that was either inconsistent
with global containment or sufficiently non-rational to be unfeasi~
ble.

Massive retaliation required, by definiticm, raising the
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stakes of responding to communist challenges so high that had
such challenges occurred, the threatened response would have
been unlikely or catastrophically excessive.

Other than adding

significantly to United States ~efense costs· and to the rhetoric
of the Cold War, the concept of[ commitments was neither particular'I

ly viable nor operationally sighificant.
Upon coming into office,

7he

Kennedy Administration shifted

to a policy of flexible response which was designed to increase
American capabilities for fighting limited conventional and nuclear wars.

The concept of conµnitment was thereby made viable
'

and operationa11y feasible.

T~e increased mobility and striking

power of Un::1,ted States forces was capable of flexible initiative
I

as well as response.

The new administration was·convinced that
i

-

I

responding to ·challenge i was inherently too limiting and unchar1

acteristically too pass~ve for:American foreign policy.

!

A new scenario emerged that.indicated that communism was
s.preading too easily and too rapidly in the underdeveloped world
because it operated in a void left by the passivity of democracy.
Were the ·forces of freedom to enter the struggle and provide an
alternative, cqmmunism could be placed on.the defensive.

Thus,

we begat nation-building and counterinsurgency, as if we knew
what we were about regarding either of those elusive notions.
Dulles' conceptualization.of commitment as rewarding those
who chose our side in a bipolarized global alignment was not
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terribly threatening since it did not suggest efforts at rolling
back the perimeters of communist domain-.
;,

In contrast, the Kennedy

and Johnson administrations redefined commitment as an active,
aggressive_ concept •. We artic_ulated a commitment to· resist by
force attempts at forcible conquest.

But we also asserted a com-

mitment, particularly in Vietnam, of creating conditions that ·
would alter the status quo by substituting positive change in
lieu of passive acceptance,

This was dramatically evidenced in

pressuring Diem to invite United States military intervention,
in the assassination of Diem, in the Tonkin Gulf incident and
others.
The Nixon administration's vaunted lower profile is still
taking shape; however, some preliminary observations concerning
commitments and alliances may be suggested,

First, bilateral

or multilateral alliances assume significantly lower priority
than in the four previous post-war adm·inistrations.

While pre-·

£erring negotiation to confrontationwith our declared adversaries,
we have preferred confrontation to negotiation with our principal
allies.

The failure to consult v1ith Japan or, less sfgnif ica.ntly,

Taiwan about the opening to China signaled a. major devaluation
of our bilateral alliances with each.

The Japan-u.s. Security

Pact can no lon~er be looked upon as the keystone to our security
policy in Asia.

The first Kissinger mission communicated a sense

I
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of urgency to Japan to begin making its own arrangements for
acconnnodating China.

Any possible interference in such signals

was·taken care of by floating the dollar and imposing the 10%
surcharge on imports without notice, much less consultation or
prior attempts at negotiating differences.
The.keystone to.our European security !)Olicy, West Germany,
was the other prime target of the new economic policy.

Certainly.

Germany's Ostpolitik was reinforced if not given added impetus
by American unilateralism.

It should be recalled that Brandt's

first articulation of the Ostpolitik was met by sharply hostile
· reactions from the Nixon administration on the grounds that it
would inherently weaken NATO.

The alliance, then, was to be

preferred to detente which was an elusive target.at best.

Today,

it would seem that detente is a higher order of priority. than·
is the Alliance.

A related item should be noted although full discussion would
carry far beyond the limits of this paper.

The Nixon admin:lstra.;;

tion demonstrates littl~ con_cern for the nuances of multilateral
diplomacy so vigorously championed by its ·riredecessors.

The new

economic policy was invoked in a fashion more reminiscent: of
de ~auJ.le' s unilateral demands upoI!- the Connnon Market than of the
Kennedy Round tariff. negotiations.

Cyn.ical grandstanding on the.

Chinese representation question at the UN was not calculated to
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protect and defend UN interests while promoting our own--yet they
were not incompatible.
the UN, not more.
alliances.

The United States wants les.s salience for

Similarly, it seeks less salience for ·the various

·It apparently exalts the American national role, re-

jecting the binding- ties of internationalism~ wispy and limp as
they are.
The Nixon-Kissinger conceptualization of commitment is essentially passive, reminiscent of Dulles' usage.
important difference.

But there is an

Dulles' passivity was rooted in a conceptu-

alized international system that·was bipolarized in two_implacably
hostile camps.

The ring of commitments and alliances represented

the frontier of American concern-the outer perimeter whose breach
might invoke retaliation upon a massive scale directed against the
opposite pole.

The Nixon-Kissinger comm~tment is rooted in an es-

sentially non-polarized international system comprising national
units, states, that interact according-to agreed upon rules of behavior found upon long standing custom and usage.

States base their

activities upon national interests; i.e., national values are more
significant than are international values._
, Comparing Nixon-Kissinger policy regarding '.faiwan to that of
· Eisenhower-Dulles illustrates the contrast very wel+·

During the

Korean War, the United States undertook to station some forces upon
Taiwan and to mount a naval patrol of the Taiwan Straits.

These
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devices were continued after the war to underscore our commitment
to defend Taiwan from an invasion by the Communist Chinese that
was neither imminent nor likely to become imminent. · At the same
time, it "guaranteed" that Chiang Kai-shek would not attempt to
launch an invasion of the mainland.

The United States presence

assured that a Chinese solution would not be promoted~ that the
conflict between Taiwan and the mai~land would be frozen inde-

.Ii

I

finitely.
The Nixon administration is apparently promoting conditions
that might be favorable to a Chinese solutio.n to the Taiwan issue
once Chiang Kai-shek departs the scene.

While remaining committed
. l

to aid Taiwan in the event of invasion, we no longer accord credibility to that threat.

Consequently, in the fall of 1969, we

decided to withdraw the destroyer patrol from the Taiwan Straits
for budgetary reasons.

Since China had long demanded such re-

.moval~ along with trade and travel relaxations, as a precondition
to "normalizing" relations, conditions were ripe for a diplomatic
move.

. .

Robert Kleiman reported that:

1

In these circumstances, Secretary of State
aogers on Nov. 7, 1969, ,secretly cabled the
American Embassies in Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei
to notify those Governments that the regular
Taiwan Straits Patrol would be discontinued for

I

I
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budget reasons on Nov. 15.

Taipei complained

bitterly in private.
But within days after the unannounced suspension of the destroyer patrol, Peking's re--:presentatives in Hong Kong were asking whether
the move had any significance.

They were as-

sured that it had.
There can be no doubt that the present administration attaches
little significance to perpetuating commitments to states which it
considers to be peripheral actors in the international system.

Our

concerns vis-a-vis the lesser actors are minimal except as they af•
feet relations among the primary actors.

United States' interests

in Vietnam, for example, are secondary to United States' ·relations
with China.

Viewed this way, United States-Vietnam policy should

not determine United States-Chinese policy; indeed, our position in
Vietnam is probably expendable if s·uch would promote our interests
with China.
As set forth in these pages? a patt_ern emerges that traces
shifts in American concepts of alH.t:i.nces and commitments through
. five post-war administ_rations.

We noted first, under Truman-Marshall-

Ache$on, the development of a pragmatic, limited policy of "containing!' the USSR in Europe by means of NATO and the Truman Doctrine.
Second, we noted under Eisenhower-Dulles, the assertion of_ bipolarity
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accompanied by proliferating alliances and commitments built upon
the NATO and Truman Doctrine models and designed to contain the
spread of monolithic communism anywhere on the globe.

Under Kennedy-

Rusk, third, we began the search for detente in Europe while
activating our Asian commitments by embarking upon nation-building
and counter-insurgency warfare in Indochina.

Under Johnson-Rusk,

fourth, while continuing the pursuit of detente with the USSR, our
escalation of the war in Vietnam was accompanied by increasingly
rigid articulations of commitment.

Under Nixon-Kissinger, finally,

we noted significant devaluation of alliances and commitments, as
well as of international organizations, as instruments for achieving United States national foreign policy objectives.
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· II
. Obviously, the concepts upon which our policies have been
based have changed.

The

interesting question arises as to what

effects such changes have on policies anc,f ultimately on outcomes.·
If the concepts underlying a policy are false, the policy is likely

to be non-efficacious or even dysfunctional.

If the·ccincept is

true, the policy may still be non-efficaci_ous or dysfunctional.
The effects of policies upon outcomes are rarely direct.

In

dealing with foreign policies especially, we often have difficulty_
identifying intervening variables, much less accounting-for them.
Yet the concept employed determines the premise upon which a given
policy may .be based.
the policy.

If the premis•e is . fallacious, so too must be

If desired ends are still achieved, the achievement.

must be attributable to unprogrammed intervening variables or to
something other than the stated policy.
Virtually any policy decision effectively narrows the range of
options available to a decision maker.

Frequently, the_ rang·e· of

options that had been available prior to·decision was so imperfectly
understood that changes in the range are difficult to perceive.
Consequently policy makers· (and critics) often d_isregard the
changing circumstances as if to.ignore wha~ is uncertain will remove
ambiguity.
When the United States enters into an alliance or undertakes a
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commitment with a nation, such an act alters United States' relations
with that nation and others.

Probably the most important effect is

the impact of such "ties" upon reduced flexibility.

The reduction

in flexibility, however, may be virtually imperceptible despite the
numerous references to the strength and viability of commitments made
by policy makers and scholars.
No alliance or commitment, for example, acts as or stimulates
an automatic£!_~ predictable response.
11

All that the parties

guarantee" is to undertake appropriate response according to each

party 9 s constitutional procedures.

Article V of the North Atlantic

Treaty includes a statement that is typical of the most specific
undertaking.

It reads, in part:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against
one or more of them in Europe or North America shall
be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack
occurs, each of them • • • will assist the Party or
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually
and in concert with the other Parties; such_act;Lon as
'it deems necessary, including the use of armed force,
to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area.

[italics added]

What is appropriate or necessary may range from verbal support
to the direct entry of military forces into combat.

Neither
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alliances nor commitments transform the decision-making processes·
of the parties to the extent that the decision· to take spec{fic
action remains no longer discretionary to.each of· the parties.
Indeed, much of t~e history of NATO ha~ encompassed disc~sslons of
the ways by which the American commitment ·to provide- physical. military support to the European all,ies can be made credible.

The

American military presence ·1s hostage to the credibility of the·
guarantee.
Short of an attack by the Soviet Union against a European ·ally,
·the American r~sponse remains speculative.

Specific contingency

plans-may be put into effect or, in the context of the crisis, n~,
decisions may be reached.

As

is well known, searching for informa-

tion, including breaking out old contingency plans, diminishes with
the intensity and urgency of a crisis;

A Soviet attack would change

the whole ball game and necessitate a revaluation of the elements
that go into making the.critical decisions.

There is a tendency in -

the literature.to gloss over such considerations-by .assuming that
the range of options has in fact been significantly narrowed~

But,

a cursory glance at history will demonstrate that· anticipat~d
predictable and obvious responses are not ·necessarily ~ade.

Even-

during an invasion, the ~arget country has a choice of responses.
In 1968, Czechoslovakia chose to submit rather than resist invasion
by Warsaw Pact forces.
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Decision makers will frequently justify their decisions as
having been forced upon them.by circumstances; however, such
justifications are patently false.

This is not to state.that

decision makers may hot be victims of self-deception although
instances of such self-deception ~re probably far less
quent than.are lapses of memory and poor judgment~

fre-

In poin~.of

fact, he who makes a decision cannot evade the responsibility
for it by passing the buck to alliance requirements or to priorcommitments.
In The American Threat, James L. Payne asserts that ousting
Castro from Cuba in 1960 or 1961 would have.created a "credible
deterrent threat 11 to" "future communist thrusts-.:.inLaos, Vietnam
112

The author argues that not only are American policy

makers bound by numerous (unstated) commitmen~s, but.that such
commitments have been thrust upqn them.because .the United States
is ."a nation following an ongoing deterrence policy."
Obligations or commitments.are, to a large- extent,
thrust upon it

[U~S.].

It has values which are

challenged by opponents;it has set precedents
in defending them.

These values and precedents

create expectations.about a nation's future behavior.
And that is, analytically; what threats or commitmerits are:

the expectations of others.

Leaders can,

of course, refuse to meet these expectations and suffer
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a corresponding loss of reputation •. But it is not
in t~eir power to eliminate, without cost, a specific
threat.
To understand this conclusion, it-is_helpful to
examine the nature of _the most general thr~at we
project:

to defend any free world country_ against

outright communist attack--should our assistance be
necessary to defeat the attack. 3
Payne is seized by the germ of an idea that was nurtured iri a
hybrid culture of official propaganda, establishmentarian scholarship
and ahistoricism.

The germ is to be found in the fact that commit- ·

ments and alliances generate legitimate demands upon the parties.
As a function of an alliance or commitment, each party may reasonably

expect the other party or parties to take some appropriate action.
Payne, among others,_ carries such commitments to the point of
inf erring that the obligation extends to the dispatch of American·
troops upon the demand of a second party.

Were this .the case, the

most critical decisions involving American strategy would be made
by a host of foreign officials for their own purposes.
The-nature of a commitment may be quite different from its
i:

articulation in official statements.

United States policy in Vietnam

cannot be explained as living up to our commitments to defend the
territorial integrity and political independence of South Vietnam.
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Quite the opposite is the case.

In 1954, we _accepted.the terms

arrived at in Geneva providing for reunification of Vietnam following
a plebiscite to be held in 1956, and prohibiting the "introduction
of foreign military personnel .or material. . Eventually -we opposed
holding the elections and pressed military assistance, inciuding
personnel, upon a reluctant Ngo Dinh Diem.
Our adventures in the 1960'.s were not a· function of military
·commitments to sundry regimes; but resulted from preoccupations
with notions of strategic policy which could only be implemented
militarily •. It was thought that carefully developed strategic
policy could produce measured effects upon target act~rs. ,Yet the
effects of discrete decisions upon the choice patterns of othe~s
are usually indeterminate except in simulated environments. - Step~_
level increments of escalation designed to "compel"

the other"

side to acquiesce or submit may make good sense in terms -of simulated
experience but are not.the product of historical research.

One

defense strategist predicted,:.in 1965, that North Viet~am would ·
relatively_quickly be brought into line by bombing because Ho Chi
Minh was no longer a guerrilla and would not -chance having his newly
indust_rialized economy destroyed.
Defining situations and posing solutions for vexing problems
is a difficult process even when perfect information is available. In the arena of foreign policy, information is usually scarce and
largely unreliable.

Situations-are defined on the basis of scanty

I

-I

·,I

I

I

information that is likely to be er~oneous •. The margin of error
tend~ to be high in the best of conditi9ns; and the margin tends
to increase expo.nentially · as .conditfop.s deteriorate.

ijut, the

opportunities for refuting such definitions of situatiilns are
. equally hampered by scarcity of reliable information.

And ·the 'imrderi.

of evid.ence generally ·rests upon those who reject ~efi_riitions of
situations and posed solutions.
Because of information scarcity, the foreign policy comniunity
tends to respond to hypotheses and theories that purport tp make
sense out of otherwise unmanageable or unintelligible data.·.-such·
hypotheses and theories offer keys which promise to unlock the
secrets of 1-nternational behavior.

Notio.ns such as the ''balance of

· power 11 and i'domino theory" are advanced as if they were. accurate·:
descriptors even though little agreeni.eµt has been reached as to the
components of power and the mechanisms of balance and even though
nations and dominoes share no logical·or analogical properties.
Under such circumstances, it should come as no surprise that
plausible arguments often substitute for logical·argu,ents~- Neither
should it be too surprising that decisions of war and peace are often
based upon plausible Il.Ot logical arguments.

Contending theories arid

arguments are frequently selected o~ aest~etic grounds'· rather than_
on the basis of their intrinsic efficacy.

If a theory or atgument

sounds 'convincing, decisio-n makers and others may be convinced~
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Plausible arguments or theories find particu'iar acceptability
when tied to predictions of dire consequences if prescribed action
is not taken.

Thus, failure to position elements of the Seventh

Fleet in the Taiwan Straits would have resulted .in the "loss" of
Taiwan to·mainland China; failure to intervene in the Dominican
Republic would have resulted in the accession of a Castro-like
government; failure to defend South Vietnam would have resulted ·in
the .fall of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, etc. _Each of thes_e statements
is a ~ sequitur in that the conclusion does not follow the stated
premis·e.

By definition, a ~ sequitur is an invalid statement.

An

invalid statement cannot serve as.a rational premise for making
d~cisions on policy issues.
~

The practice of statesmen in articulating

sequiturs is widespread and may be condoned as an attribute of

political license •. The use of non sequiturs by scholars is also
widespread and should not be condoned b·ecause the product of such
~

se~uiturs is and can only be nonsense.

When policymakers turn

to scholars for advice and counsel, they should be .better served.
In the (newly written) introduction to A World Restored,Henry
.

·Kissinger asserts that:

.

.

"Whenever.peace:--conceived of as the

avoidance of war--has been the primary objective of a power or a ·
·group of powers, the internationat system has bee!'- at the mercy of
the most ruthless member of the international c.ominunity. 114

This is
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presented as axiomatic, as an unassailable proposition.

Yet, it

cannot be axiomatic since the avoidance of war by a power or a
group of powers is not logically related to the mercy of the
ruthless.
ment:

Two unstated assumptions may be gleaned from the state-

First, that war is a function of the avoidance of war; and

second, that the quest for peace rather than stability results in
disequilibrium which will likely lead to war.
In discussing stability, et al., Kissinger illustrates another
logical fallacy which permeates the literature, tautological
reasoning.

He states that 1iwhenever the international order has

acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised even
for the sake of peace, stability based on an equilibrium of forces
was at least conceivable. 115

"International order" is not defined

but may be contextually derived as a function of "legitimacy" which
"means no more than an internatio.nal agreement about the nature of
workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of
foreign policy. 116

And stability is a function of legitimacy, "having

resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted
legitimacy. 117
order.

Thus, international order= legitimacy= stability=

And the notion is reduced to a tautology incapable of

explanation or of description.
Any power "which considers the international order or the manner
of legitimizing it oppressive" is a revolutionary power and all
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"relations between it and other powers will be revolutionary. 118
Adjustment of differences will be "tactical maneuvers to consolidate
positions for the inevitable showdo~m, or as tools to undermine the

.

morale of the antagonist."

Diplomacy ("the adjustment of differences

through negotiation," "the art of restraining the exercise of
power 11 ) 9 is impossible:.in relations with a revolutionary power; it
11

is replaced either by war or by an armaments race. 11 10
Kissinger suggests that the pursuit of peace with a revolutionary

power jeopardizes stability because. it places the international system
at the mercy of the

11

most ruthless" power.

clusion, he reifies concepts so that:

In arriving at this con-

"ages • • • search," "intP.rna-

tional order has acknowledged, 11 and !!states may die. • . • "
The lesson of

A World Restored is clear:

we must confront

revolutionary powers with sufficient force to compel
of legitimate international order.

their acceptance

Measures short of a threat or

use of force will endanger stability.

So long as the disputants

accept the principles of international order (as in the Middle East),
stability may be maintained by means of equilibrated forces.

If a

disputant is revolutionary (such as North Vietnam), entering into
negotiations would jeopardize the stability of the international
system.

But revolutionary powers may always avail themselves of

the option of accepting the rules thereby becoming nonrevolutionary.
Thus, the government of North Vietnam could make negotiations at
Paris possible by agreeing to (1)
release prisoners, and (3)

refrain from using force, (2)

recognize (de facto) the legitimacy of

the government of the Republic of Vietnam.
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III

Examined in the context of Kissinger's

11

theory 11 of interna-

tional relations, the Nixon-Kissinger conceptualization of alliances
"

and commitments appears to contain prominent doctrinaire elements
which are quite dissimilar to Dulles' ideological constructs.
Kissinger apparently finds differentiating between communist and
non-communist states essentially uninteresting from the standpoint
of classifying state behaviors.

To Kissinger, the critical ques-

tion is whether or not a given state is revolutionary or stable
("legitimate").

Communist states may or may not be revolutionary;

hence, may or may not be threatening.

To Dulles, the threat posed

to non-communist states by communist states was inherently functional to communist ideology.

Revolutionary regimes were threaten-

ing, therefore, if and only if they were communist.
Examined out of the context of Kissinger's "theory," the
policies adopted by the Nixon administration appear to bear more
resemblance to the pragmati$m of Truman-Acheson than to the foreign
policies of the other post-war administrations.

But, examined in

context, the dissimilarities are striking.
The principal contrast between Kissinger and Acheson arises
in their views of the international system.

Kissinger posits a

closed system comprising national actors each of which does its
own thing according to implicitly codified rules of behavior.

States
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that reject the rules, threaten the stability of the system;
therefore, they must become legitimate or be suppressed.
Kissinger argues that dysfunctional behavior by one state or
a group of states threatens the maintenance of the delicate
equilibrium establlshed by international order.
Acheson's approach was sharply different.

He tended to

reject all notions of an international system as the plain
or fancied gibberish of social scientists and poets.

Acheson's

• pragmatism insisted that "solutions" may only be devised for
concrete problems.

He was not interested in such abstract

concepts as international order, stability, equilibrium, or
legitimacy.

Neither was he concerned with reinforcing proper

international etiquette.

Finally, Acheson did not accord much

significance to adjectival "descriptors" such as revolutionary,
communist, legitimate, peace-loving, or democratic.
To Kissinger the means employed by the United States are
designed to achieve an end which is a more orderly world system.
To Dulles the means were designed to achieve the end of preventing monolithic communism from engulfing the world.

To Rusk,

the means were often ambivalently designed to achieve rather
ambiguous ends, such as rapprochement with the USSR while
reversing the tide of communist advances in Southeast Asia
particularly and the Third World generally.

To Acheson, the

means of foreign policy was what it was all about.
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